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Abstract
This paper evaluates the influence of online news consumption on attitudes towards the
European Union in a context of protracted economic crisis. Using data from the 2011
Irish National Election Study, we combine location-specific information on broadband
availability with respondent geo-location data, which facilitates causal inference about
the effects of online news consumption via instrumental variable (IV) models. We find
that Irish citizens who source political information online are more prone to blame the EU
for the poor state of the economy than those who do not. We find evidence of preference
reinforcement among those with negative predispositions towards the EU, but not among
pro-EU citizens. We complement this analysis with a study of voting behaviour in the Eu-
ropean Fiscal Compact Referendum, employing a similar methodological approach. The
results from this second survey confirm the anti-EU influence of online news consumption
among Irish citizens, although we find suggestive evidence of a pro-EU effect among voters
who browsed the website of the politically neutral Irish Referendum Commission. Our
paper contributes to the literature on public opinion, the EU, and political attitudes in
times of crisis.
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1 Introduction
A voluminous literature dating back to Lippmann (1922) argues that mass media play
a crucial role in public opinion formation. There is no shortage of empirical research
exploring the impact of traditional media on public opinion and political behaviour (for
a review of the debate on minimal versus massive media effects, see Bennett and Iyengar
2008). However, while the mass adoption of online communication technologies from the
mid 1990s onwards has dramatically changed how people access, consume, and exchange
information, the Internet’s impact on citizens’ attitudes towards relevant institutions,
political actors and policies is currently empirically under-explored. In this paper, we
contribute to filling this gap in the literature by examining how online newsgathering
affects citizens’ perceptions of the role played by the EU during a period of protracted
economic crisis.
The key question that we pose here is whether exposure to the Internet as a source
of political information exerts a causal influence on citizens attribution of blame to the
EU for the ongoing economic crisis. Because, relative to traditional media, the Internet
provides political information that is more voluminous, less strenuously controlled and
created by a far more fragmented population, we argue that online newsgathering has the
potential to exercise a substantively important influence over public attitudes towards the
EU. Moreover, we explore whether medium-specific effects are conditioned by predisposi-
tions towards the EU. This approach builds on the repeated finding that the translation
of economic information into responsibility attributions is influenced by perceptual bi-
ases arising from political predispositions. At the national level, partisanship is the key
source of such perceptual biases (Marsh and Tilley 2010; Malhotra and Margalit 2010;
Malhotra and Kuo 2008; Tilley and Hobolt 2011), whereas at the EU level Hobolt et al.
(2013) demonstrate that predispositions towards the EU condition the manner in which
information on policy performance is used to attribute responsibility to the EU. Because
the Internet facilitates the polarisation of pre-existing opinions by providing a space for
extreme content and maximizing users’ control over content selection, we expect citizens’
predispositions towards the EU to be reinforced by online newsgathering.
In assessing the effect of the Internet on attitudes towards the EU, we anticipate a
negative medium effect. This expectation is rooted in the well-documented tendency of in-
dividuals to be more likely to retain negative information (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Ito et al., 1998). This is particularly true in a time of crisis, when there is no shortage of
negative information and demand for it grows higher (Soroka, 2006). Building on these
insights, we argue that the reinforcement effect of online newsgathering is asymmetric: a
strong impact on negative attitudes towards the EU for Eurosceptics and a weak impact
on positive attitudes towards the EU for Europhiles.
In order to test these contentions, we employ public opinion data from an EU member
state in the midst of a profound economic crisis: Ireland. After a period of extraordinary
economic growth from the mid-1990s to late 2008, most of Ireland’s major banks abruptly
collapsed. A costly government bailout of these banks coincided with the bursting of Ire-
land’s property bubble - leading to high unemployment, a halt in GDP growth figures
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and rapidly escalating government debt (ESRI 2013). The state’s inability to finance its
debt on the international bond markets led to the European Union/European Central
Bank/International Monetary Fund conditional bailout of the Irish exchequer in Novem-
ber, 2010. The EU/ECB/IMF bailout brought a significant European dimension to the
Irish crisis.
In our analysis, we integrate data from the 2011 Irish National Election Study (INES
2011) with an original survey on voting behaviour in the 2012 Irish Fiscal Compact Ref-
erendum. By doing so, we are able to examine as dependent variables both citizens’
attribution of blame to the EU, expressed as attitudinal responses in the INES 2011, and
their behavioural reactions to European-level policies aimed at tackling the crisis (i.e.
their vote choice in an EU Referendum). We argue that, taken together, these elements
provide a robust measurement of citizens’ attitudes towards the EU’s role in the economic
crisis. To make causal inferences about the effect of the Internet on public opinion, we
employ an instrumental variable estimation that mimics the dynamics of experimental
studies. Specifically, we exploit geographical variation in the availability of broadband in
Ireland to instrument online newsgathering.
Our results indicate that exposure to the Internet as a news source fosters a greater
proclivity to blame the EU for the current economic crisis and to vote against EU-level
policy solutions to the crisis. Among those respondents who report low levels of confi-
dence in the EU, online newsgathering engenders a greater likelihood of blaming the EU
for the crisis and voting against the Fiscal Treaty. Among those who report higher levels
of confidence in the EU, on the other hand, online newsgathering does not appear to foster
a more positive evaluation of the EU’s crisis management. Finally, we note that there
is suggestive evidence of a ‘pro-EU’ effect among those citizens who used the Internet
exclusively to source politically-neutral information.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the literature on the-
orizing expectations. In section three, we present our theory and hypotheses. We then
introduce our data and outline our methodological approach in section four. In section
five, we present our main results by analysing the INES 2011. In section sixth, we pro-
vide additional evidence that further validates our findings and expand the analysis by
integrating data from the 2012 Fiscal Compact Referendum survey. We conclude with a
discussion of the implications of our study for future research.
2 Mediated Information, Attitudes Towards the EU
and the Economic Crisis
Despite an initial consensus on the ‘minimal effects’ thesis (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Berelson
et al. 1954), more recent research on media effects has produced evidence of empirically
identifiable and substantively significant effects of mass media exposure on political opin-
ions and behaviours, once appropriate estimation techniques are implemented (DellaVigna
and Kaplan 2007; Enikolopov et al. 2011; Kern and Haimuller 2009 for estimations using
instrumental variables; Ladd and Lenz 2009 for panel data; Gerber et al. 2009; Iyengar
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and Hahn, 2009; Jerit et al. 2013 for experimental studies and comparison across experi-
mental approaches).
Addressing the consequential effects of media on public attitudes and voting behaviour
is especially crucial with regard to the EU because of the lack of direct interaction be-
tween citizens and European-level institutions (Dalton and Duval 1986). Therefore, the
role of mediated information has been an object of attention for scholars interested in
understanding citizens’ attitudes towards the EU. Intense media coverage has been linked
to increases in citizens’ levels of knowledge of the EU (De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006)
and higher turnout has been observed in media environments where the election campaign
is featured prominently (Banducci and Semetko 2004). To date, however, little scholarly
attention has been paid to the questions of whether and how the Internet weighs into this
process.1
Our study directly addresses the impact of new media on public opinion towards the
EU and, in particular, the apportionment of political blame in a time of economic crisis.
Since this crisis is at once complex and unprecedented (Hellwig and Coffey; 2011: 418),
the attribution of political responsibility depends crucially on the information citizens
access and process. A vital conditioning role in the conversion of information into evalua-
tions is played by political predispositions. Jerit and Barabas (2012: 682) find a “selective
pattern of learning” from the news media among partisans, indicating that pre-existing
opinions and attitudes play a major role in consuming and absorbing information from
the media. Just as partisanship influences how voters attribute credit and blame at the
national level, pre-existing attitudes towards the European Union appear to shape blame
attribution at the European level (Hobolt et al. 2013).
While pre-existing attitudes orient citizens media consumption and condition media
effects, in times of economic crisis we are all confronted with a disproportionate amount
of negative information. Previous studies show that negative information tends to have
a greater impact than positive information on public opinion. Asymmetric responses
to positive and negative information are suggested by the prospect theory in economics
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) as well as by the cognitive psychology literature (Ito et
al., 1998.). This asymmetry is particular strong in relation to economic news coverage.
For instance, Soroka (2006: 381) finds that economic crises are more likely to lead to
pessimistic attitudes toward the economy than in routine times.
In sum, the aforementioned strands of literature provide us with three solid insights:
(1) attitudes toward the EU are influenced by mediated information; (2) predispositions
toward the EU condition information effects in the attribution of political blame; (3)
responses to positive and negative mediated information are asymmetric. In the next
section, we apply these insights to the case of online newsgathering, explore their interplay,
and outline our theoretical expectations.
1An exception is De Wilde et al. (2013), who content-analyse expressions of Euroscepticism in online
media across 12 member states in the 2009 European Parliament campaign. However, their analysis does
not deal with the consequences of online-based information and communication for public opinion.
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3 Theory and Hypotheses
The Internet is a substantially different information medium to newspapers, radio or tele-
vision. Compared to these traditional media, the web exponentially multiplies citizens’
opportunities to gather political information. When reading a newspaper, an individual
is confined to what is contained between its first and last page; on the Internet such
boundaries simply do not exist. As a consequence, each individual will access different
content while browsing for news online, depending on the links that he or she follows and
the type of interaction that he or she undertakes with the websites visited. Moreover,
the content of web pages that users may come across is often radically different to what
can be read in a newspaper, heard on a radio or viewed on TV. While media publishers
and regulatory authorities act as gatekeepers to what can be broadcast and printed, the
Internet remains a largely unregulated space with extremely low barriers to entry. There-
fore, online newsgathering can entail exposure to a tranche of opinions and statements
that are unverified and possibly confounding, as well as to large volumes of factual infor-
mation. Finally, online news is particularly suited to fast consumption in short amounts
of time. The scroll-down format of webpages presents users with a voluminous amount of
information that can be visualized in few seconds.
Given these characteristics of online newsgathering, assessing what a subject retains
from a browsing session is a complex endeavour. Nevertheless, by setting apart those who
have embedded the Internet in their news consumption patterns from those who have not,
we can estimate the unique effect of the medium on public opinion. Therefore, we begin
by exploring whether online newsgathering has an independent effect on evaluations of
the EU’s role in the crisis. In so doing, we anticipate that if an effect is to be found it
will be a negative one. Three considerations motivate this expectation. First, there is the
above-mentioned tendency of negative information to be more memorable than positive
information. Second, the Internet gives users unprecedented control of content selection,
and individuals show a higher propensity to select negative news (Trussels and Soroka,
2014). Third the context of this study a severe economic downturn increases the volume
of negative information (Soroka, 2006), particularly in a country like Ireland, where fiscal
conditionality and austerity measures were imposed by the IMF, ECB and EU. More
formally, we test the following hypothesis:
HP1 : Those who gather news online display significantly more negative attitudes
towards the EU’s role in the economic crisis than those who do not, ceteris paribus.
Media effects do not, however, happen in a void. Citizens have pre-existing prefer-
ences and attitudes. Information consumption patterns depend upon these preferences
(Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Taber and Lodge 2006; Stroud 2007) and such perceptual biases
can affect retention of information (Cobb et al., 2013). This applies to traditional media,
but it is particularly relevant to the case of the Internet. Nie et al. (2010) show that
using the Internet as a news source exacerbates pre-existing political tendencies, as users
can tailor the content that they consume. Simultaneously, the Internet also creates a
‘supply’ of news that saturates the political space, overlapping with mainstream media at
the centre of the distribution, but providing a unique space for the publication of extreme
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opinions (Nie et al., 2010; Kim and Kim, 2012). By combining selective exposure with
a supply of politically extreme views, the Internet is tailor-made to reinforce the predis-
positions of its users. With regard to crisis, Hobolt (2014) shows that in evaluating the
role of the EU an absolve/castigate mechanism - Europhiles exculpate and Eurosceptics
condemn Europe - comes into play.
Notwithstanding predispositions, the considerations on the asymmetric effects of pos-
itive and negative information and on the context of the crisis remain. Even those who
may orient their self-selection of news around positive attitudes towards Europe may en-
counter a high degree of negativity about the EU on the web. Therefore, the effect of
negative information on the probability of blaming the EU is likely to be larger for Eu-
rosceptics than the effect of positive information on the probability of absolving the EU
for Europhiles. We test for reinforcement by anticipating that the effects will be substan-
tially different for the two groups.
HP2a : Individuals who are negatively disposed towards the EU and gather news
from the Internet will be considerably more likely to blame the EU for the economic crisis
than individuals who are negatively disposed towards the EU and do not gather news
online.
HP2b : Individuals who are positively disposed towards the EU and gather news from
the Internet will be moderately less likely to blame the EU for the economic crisis than
individuals who are positively disposed towards the EU and do not gather news online.
Our empirical strategy enables us (a) to isolate the net difference in blame attribution
between Internet users and non-users, (b) to explore whether pre-existing opinions con-
dition this difference, and (c) to assess the difference in the extent to which media effects
reinforce predispositions. Armed with these expectations, we proceed to the empirical
analysis.
4 Data and Empirical Model
Our analysis relies principally upon the 2011 wave of the Irish National Election Study
(INES). The 2011 general election was held on February 25th 2011, following the Green
Party’s abrupt withdrawal from government on January 23rd. The 2011 wave of the INES
aggregates data from 1,863 voters.2
Additionally, we employ data from an original survey of Irish voters conducted after
the Fiscal Compact Referendum on May 31st 2012. A representative sample of 1,000
Irish voters was interviewed immediately after the referendum and asked a battery of
questions on their voting behaviour, their attitudes towards national and international
2Fieldwork face-to-face interviews - was performed by the polling company Red C between March
6th and April 10th. Funding for the 2001 project was provided by the Political Studies Association of
Ireland, Trinity College Dublin, Richard Sinnott (University College Dublin), Google and the Electoral
Reform Society. The Principal Investigator was Michael Marsh, Trinity College Dublin.
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actors, and their patterns of online newsgathering in the run-up to the vote.3 This second
source of data allows us to corroborate our analysis of the INES data by estimating the
effects of online newsgathering on a popular vote about an EU-level policy measure that
aimed to address the economic crisis.4 Furthermore, the questions on patterns of online
newsgathering in this survey allow us to disentangle the effects of specific types of websites.
4.1 Dependent Variable
Our main dependent variable captures the extent to which respondents blame the EU for
the economic crisis. Specifically, it is based on the following question from the INES 2011:
‘In the past few years the economy has been in recession. How responsible, if at all, is
the European Union for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? Extremely
responsible (4), Very responsible (3), Moderately responsible (2), A little responsible (1),
Not at all responsible (0), Don’t know (5)’.
The resulting variable is ordinal and ranges between 0 and 4. We drop the ‘don’t
know’ answers, so we exclude 118 observations for the EU item.5
4.2 Treatment
We code a binary variable Online that takes a value of 1 for respondents who browse the
Internet for politically-relevant news at least once a week and 0 for respondents who never
do so. The set of respondents who consume online news is defined as our treatment group,
whereas the set of respondents who do not go online for news is defined as our control
group (Rubin 1974; Rosenbaum 2002).
Our treatment is built on a question that asked whether respondents browse the web
for politically relevant news and how frequently they do so. In our dataset, 311 respon-
dents use the Internet as a source of political news, i.e. 20 percent of our sample. We
recode this ordinal variable as a dummy to facilitate the interpretation of our results and
to ease our identification strategy (Imbens and Wooldridge 2008; Kern and Hainmueller
2009). Since our instrument (described below) predicts only whether respondents go on-
line but not how often they go, using an ordinal variable would be problematic to correctly
identify our models. In any case, our results are very similar if we rely on such an ordinal
variable. Moreover, we obtain similar results if we use different thresholds to create our
treatment. Specifically, we build two alternative treatments that score one if respondents
respectively go online more than twice a week and more than four times a week (all of
these robustness checks are shown in the online appendix).
3The phone survey was performed by RED C.
4The Fiscal treaty was approved by 60.3% of voters with an overall 50% turnout. 32% of respondents
in our survey reported voting ‘No’ to the Treaty.
5We note here that if we recode the ‘don’t know’ values as midpoints the results are unchanged (see
online appendix).
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4.3 Covariates
We include a set of covariates to mitigate the omitted variable problem and avoid over-
estimating the effect of our treatment. In the baseline model we incorporate socio-
economic characteristics. These variables are included as controls in all of our models
because they influence both attitudes towards the EU and the respondents probability of
going online.
Moreover, in Model 2, we include variables relating to media consumption - capturing
how many times a week respondents read newspapers, watch TV, and listen to the radio
for political news to account for the impact of traditional media. We also control for a
fragmentation of respondents’ newspaper consumption by means of a dichotomous vari-
able that separates those who regularly read three or more newspapers from those who
do not. McMenamin et al. (2013) point out that fragmentation of electoral frames in
the Irish media was particularly pronounced during the 2011 electoral campaign. Thus,
it might be the case that such a variety of frames in oﬄine media impacts citizens’ views
of the role of the EU.
Furthermore, we add a variable, labelled Left, that scores one if respondents are close
to either Sinn Fe´in and/or the United Left Alliance, the two consistently eurosceptic
parties that occupy the extreme left of the Irish ‘left-right’ continuum. We code the vari-
able Left one if respondents score eight or more than eight on an eleven-point like/dislike
scale for either Sinn Fe´in or United Left Alliance, and 0 otherwise. We include two fur-
ther standard controls for attitudes towards Europe: (1) a variable capturing the level
of confidence in the EU (EU Confidence); (2) a variable capturing attitudes towards im-
migration (Attitude toward Immigration). We also control for a variable capturing the
respondent’s self-declared level of interest in politics. Additionally, we include a dummy,
labelled Economy, that scores one if respondents mention the state of the economy among
the first or second most important issues during the 2011 campaign.
Finally, to further control for the urban/rural divide, which significantly affects broad-
band penetration in Ireland, in Model 4 we include a continuous variable capturing the
distance of the respondent’s location from the closest city. Specifically, Distance from
City measures the distance (in kilometres) of the respondent’s location from the centre of
the nearest city (Ireland’s cities are defined by the 2001 Local Government Act as Dublin,
Cork, Galway, Limerick and Waterford). Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for all
the variables included in our models.
Table 1 about here
4.4 Identification Strategy
Browsing for political news online is not randomly assigned to individuals. In this case,
instrumental variables offer an effective identification strategy. We take advantage of the
uneven geographical availability of broadband in Ireland and our econometric approach
is similar to that of Kern and Hainmueller (2009). In particular, we exploit the fact that
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not every area in Ireland enjoyed broadband coverage during the period under investiga-
tion. We code a binary instrument based on information about where respondents live.
This dummy variable scores 1 if respondents live in an area with broadband coverage
and 0 otherwise. Since this measure of broadband coverage is an original variable (i.e.
it is not included in the INES 2011 dataset), we detail below how we built this instrument.
We first encoded the geographical location (latitude and longitude) of respondents
(available from the INES 2011). The 1,854 respondents were based in 309 different geo-
graphical locations (six respondents per location). We searched for broadband coverage
in each location by consulting information supplied by major broadband providers and,
additionally, by using two online services which provide detailed information on broad-
band coverage by location (getbroadband.ie and bonkers.ie).6 For those locations without
broadband coverage, we also performed a final check by searching for the keywords “loca-
tion+broadband” on google.ie.7 Figure 1 maps the locations of the respondents to INES
2011 with and without broadband coverage.
Figure 1 about here
Formally, we estimate the following models:
Online = α0 + β1Broadband Coveragei + β2Xi + ηj + 1i (1)
Blaming EU = α1 + β3Ônlinei + β4Xi + ηj + 2i, (2)
where Online is the dependent variable, Broadband Coverage is our instrument, and
X is a vector of control variables. Moreover, β1, β2, β3, and β4 are the coefficients, α0 and
α1 are constants, and 1i and 2i are error terms. Furthermore, ηj are constituency fixed
effects to account for heterogeneity among different areas in Ireland.8 In the main analysis
we use a 2SLS-IV model with adjusted standard errors clustered by the 43 electoral
constituencies. Following common practice, we use the Eicker-Huber-White sandwich
estimator.9
4.4.1 Identification Assumptions
According to Abadie (2003, 234-235), four non-parametric assumptions allow one to iden-
tify causal effects in an instrumental variable (IV) model, and we outline how our data
meet them in this sub-section. The first assumption requires that it is not the case that
there are people who would have browsed for political news online if they had lived in an
6These websites were accessed between October 2011 and December 2011 for the INES dataset and
again in June 2012 in order to obtain updated information on respondents to the Fiscal Compact Refer-
endum survey.
7For all those locations where the location name was present in more than one county, we used the
search: “location+broadband+constituency”.
8We are unable to use sampling location fixed effects since we have only six observations per location.
9Our results are virtually the same if we implement a two-stage estimation ‘by hand’, i.e. a probit
in the first stage and an ordered probit (with bootstrapped standard errors) in the second stage. These
additional analyses are available upon request.
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area without broadband coverage, but would not have browsed for political news online
if they had lived in an area with broadband coverage. This seems highly unlikely.10
The second assumption requires that broadband coverage is a strong instrument for
browsing the Internet for news. In other words, the instrument must be highly correlated
with our treatment, conditional on Xi. Figure 2 shows that living in an area without
broadband coverage is strongly correlated with the probability of not browsing for political
news online. Only a few respondents who live in areas without broadband coverage
gather news online once or twice a week. Conversely, living in an area with broadband
coverage is strongly associated with gathering political news online. The correlation
between broadband coverage and online newsgathering is 0.41. Moreover, when we regress
broadband coverage on online newsgathering controlling for a large number of covariates,
broadband coverage is statistically significant and the F statistics of the first stage are
always greater than 10.
Figure 2 about here
The last two of Abadie’s (2003) four assumptions are more difficult to justify. The
third assumption supposes that the area in which a respondent lives is ‘as good as ran-
domly assigned’ once we condition on control variables. Assumption four states that
broadband coverage explains variation of the dependent variable only through its effect
on browsing for news online. These two assumptions together imply that, once we control
for a set of covariates, living in an area without broadband per se should not impact
directly on respondents’ propensity to blame the EU for the crisis (but, instead, should
do so only through our treatment, browsing the Internet for news).11
A way to ensure that these two assumptions are met is to make sure that areas with
broadband coverage are similar to areas without broadband coverage in relation to charac-
teristics that might affect attitudes towards the EU’s role in the economic crisis. To do so,
we rely on entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2011). This technique is similar to propensity
matching, but it does not drop unbalanced observations from the analysis. Specifically,
entropy balancing re-weights observations with respect to the instrument (i.e. Broadband
Coverage) so that all the relevant covariates are balanced (i.e. they have the same mean).12
Table 2 shows the means of all the covariates in areas with and without broadband
coverage before and after running ‘ebalance’. By using entropy balancing the difference in
10We acknowledge that people may access the Internet via 3G devices and/or access the Internet at the
workplace. However, as long as 3G use or accessing the Internet from work is not systematically related
to broadband access, our effects should still be identified. Moreover, such a possibility may run against
our likelihood of observing an effect. If people in places with no broadband availability have other means
to access the Internet, our effects should be underestimated.
11The correlation between the instrument and the residuals of the second stage is 0.05 and is not
statistically significant.
12In econometric terms, entropy balancing re-weights the observations to statistically generate a region
of common support where areas with and without broadband coverage are comparable on structural
covariates. Entropy balancing does this by directly incorporating covariate balance into the weighting
function that is applied to the sample units. The net result is that we can compare areas with broadband
coverage to a comparable counterfactual of areas without broadband coverage.
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means between people living in areas with broadband and people living in areas without
broadband is substantially reduced and is never statistically significantly different from
zero.13
Table 2 about here
5 Main Results
We begin our inferential analysis by running our baseline model and the extensive models
using 2SLS-IV with entropy balancing (Table 3). In all the models the Online coefficient
is always positive and statistically significant at (at least) the 95 percent confidence level.
Thus, our analysis implies that people who gather news online attribute more blame to
the EU for the economic crisis than people who do not. Given that the mean of the
outcome variable is 1.57, the magnitude of the effect is substantial, ranging between 2.18
and 1.37.14 This implies that gathering information online increases the probability of
blaming the EU by (up to) two points. If the average respondent thinks that the EU is
moderately responsible for the crisis, the effects of online newsgathering shift the opinion
to thinking that the EU is extremely responsible for the crisis. These findings support
our first hypothesis, indicating that online newsgathering is a causal driver of negative
attitudes towards the EU. Irish citizens who consume online news tend to attribute greater
blame to the EU for the economic crisis compared to those who do not gather political
information online.
Table 3 about here
In models 6 and 7 we test our reinforcement hypotheses by implementing a split-
sample analysis in which we divide our sample, running separate regressions for those
respondents with high levels of confidence in the EU versus those with low confidence
in the EU. Specifically, we use the variable EU Confidence. The low-EU-confidence sub-
sample is made of the respondents who have ‘not very much confidence or ‘no confidence
at all in the EU. The high-EU-confidence sub-sample is made of the respondents who
have ‘a great deal of confidence or ‘quite a lot of confidence in the EU.15 The results only
partially support the reinforcement argument. The anti-EU effect of online newsgathering
is most pronounced among those respondents who hold negative dispositions towards the
EU, i.e. there is support for H2a. The coefficient for Online is positive and statistically
significant in Model 6. On the contrary, the coefficient for Online is not statistically
significant in model 7. Our analysis indicates that predisposition reinforcement does not
take place among respondents who have high levels of confidence in the EU. Indeed, Eu-
rophiles who gather online news are not even moderately less likely to blame the EU for
13When we re-weight observations using entropy balancing, the correlation between the instrument and
the residuals in the second stage is 0.04 and is not statistically significant.
14Regarding 2SLS-IV, (1) the Kleibergen-Paap test shows that our models are not under-identified; (2)
the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is always greater than 10; (3) the orthogonality conditions are valid
(the Anderson-Rubin test is always significant). All diagnostics are reported in Table 3.
15Our results are similar if we use an interaction term. Details on the identification strategy and results
are provided in the Appendix.
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the economic crisis compared to Europhiles who do not go online.
These asymmetrical reinforcement effects indicate that the medium triggers the cas-
tigation mechanism but fails to propel the absolution one. The Chi2 test indicates that
the effect of online information consumption is statistically significantly different between
the two groups (Chi2 = 3.60, p<0.1) with greater magnitude for the Eurosceptics. Such
a different effect between Europhiles and Eurosceptics suggests that the former group
is less influenced by negative mediated information compared to the latter group. The
take-away message is that Internet triggers no positive reinforcement for Europhiles, but
online negative information does not affect them as much as it affects Eurosceptics.
To mitigate concerns about violation of the exclusion restriction, we create a variable
which captures the distance of an area with broadband from the closest geographical area
without broadband. Using this variable, we re-run our main models limiting the sample to
areas with broadband that are maximum 3 kilometres (10th percentile) and 9 kilometres
(50th percentile) apart from areas without broadband.16 Even with this relatively low
number of observations, our main results are similar to the ones reported above, adding
plausibility to the internal validity of our analysis (Models 8-11 in Table 4). Finally,
we re-run our main models dropping those respondents who live in Dublin, which is by
far the largest Irish city and is also Ireland’s most important economic centre. We do
so to avoid the possibility that our results are driven by a coincidence of urban/rural
and broadband/no broadband areas. By removing respondents from Dublin, we seek to
demonstrate that our findings are not driven by urban/rural social, political and economic
differences. Once again, our main findings are robust to this specification (Models 12-14
in Table 4).
Table 4 about here
Overall, we find that online newsgathering fosters higher levels of blame attribution to
the EU, apparently via a mechanism of reinforcing negative predispositions, while failing
to reinforce positive ones. This may be due to the context of the crisis, which accentuates
the viability of negative views on the EU. The origins of the crisis and potential solutions
remain obscure to most citizens, whose most vivid concern is living with its consequences.
In such a scenario, where ordinary citizens are overwhelmed by complex contradictory
information, negative messages could be particularly effective. Soroka (2006) shows that
public opinion reacts asymmetrically to economic information, finding that negative news
appears to exert a stronger effect than positive news. Moreover, we might attribute the
findings discussed in this section to the presence in online spaces of negative opinions
(which are less likely to appear in traditional media) regarding the role of the EU in the
crisis. The following section provides some indications that online spaces do indeed vary
in their capacity to affect public opinion.
16Given the low number of observations, we are unable to perform a split-sample test for Model 8.
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6 EU Fiscal Compact Referendum
The European Fiscal Compact Treaty - signed on March 2nd 2012 - is one of the key
measures that the EU adopted in response to the sovereign debt crisis affecting many of
its member states. Because the ratification of EU treaties in Ireland is subject to referen-
dum approval, the Irish case offers a unique opportunity to examine voting behaviour in
a referendum concerning the EU’s policy response to the crisis. Our assumption here is
that voting in favour of the Compact represents an implicit positive assessment not only
of this policy instrument but, more generally, of EU economic policies implemented to
tackle the crisis. Conversely, a ‘No’ vote implies a negative evaluation of such measures.
Furthermore, the survey on the Fiscal Compact Referendum provides more nuanced data
on the specific websites that respondents visited, allowing for some additional insights
into how different online loci influence public opinion towards the EU. In particular, re-
spondents were asked whether they had visited (a) the Internet; (b) the website of the
Referendum Commission; (c) political blogs and forums.
First, we re-run our main model using the Fiscal Compact survey data. In this anal-
ysis, our outcome variable is a dummy that scores one if the respondent votes ‘No’ to the
EU Fiscal Treaty.17 Moreover, although we do not have the same extensive set of control
variables as for INES 2011, we include a set of covariates capturing key socio-economic
characteristics, attitudes towards the EU and the national government, and evaluations
of the Treaty’s effects.18 We use a similar research design to the one employed in our main
analysis: (1) we instrument Online using Broadband Coverage; (2) we balance control vari-
ables with respect to Broadband Coverage using entropy balancing (see Table A15 in the
online appendix). Table 5 shows the results of this analysis, which confirms our previous
findings. Specifically, use of the Internet as a news source has a positive and statistically
significant effect on the probability of voting ‘No’ to the EU Fiscal Compact (Model 15).
This result, using an alternative dependent variable and an alternative dataset, supports
the findings presented above: online newsgathering increases Irish citizens’ probability of
holding a negative view of the EU’s role in the economic crisis.19
Second, we explore the impact of specific types of online spaces on voting behaviour in
relation to the Fiscal Compact referendum. We create two treatments: Referendum Com-
mission Website, which scores one if respondents only visited the Referendum Commission
website for information about the referendum and scores zero otherwise, and Forums and
Blogs, which scores one if respondents only visited forums/blogs and scores zero other-
wise. These two variables account for two online platforms that vary in the extent to
which they host opinionated versus factual information. In particular, the Referendum
Commission provides factual and balanced information to voters.20 On the contrary, blogs
and forums host opinions that have not undergone a fact-checking process similar to what
is guaranteed by traditional media outlets or institutional websites, resulting in a more
17 We drop those respondents who refused to answer this question. We are left with 948 observations.
18A detailed justification of the inclusion of these covariates is provided in the appendix.
19We are unable to run a split-sample analysis on this dataset due to the low number of observations.
20The Referendum Commission provided an array of informative material: a youtube video inviting
citizens to vote, links to additional audio-visual material, and a booklet. See http://www.refcom.ie/
en/Past-Referendums/Fiscal-Stability-Treaty/.
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opinionated informational output.
Given the very low numbers of respondents who only used the Referendum Commis-
sion website (22 respondents) and forums/blogs (31 respondents), we are unable to run a
2SLS-IV, since the instrument is not statistically significant in the first stage. Thus, we
run a simple probit regression in which we include both Referendum Commission Web-
site and Forums and Blogs as well as all our control variables on the right hand-side
(Model 16). Specifically, Referendum Commission Website is negative and statistically
significant, i.e. respondents who only visit the Referendum Commission website are less
likely to vote ‘No’. Conversely, Forums and Blogs has a positive effect on the ‘No’ vote,
although this effect is not statistically significant. Putting these findings together, there
is evidence that online content and hosting platforms matter, although these results must
be taken with a grain of salt given the aforementioned caveats in the data.
Table 5 about here
7 Conclusion
This paper has explored the impact of the Internet on the Irish public’s evaluation of the
role of the European Union in the on-going economic crisis. The provision of respondent
geo-location data in the 2011 INES and Fiscal Compact Referendum survey, together with
detailed geographical information on broadband availability in the Republic of Ireland,
has allowed us to assess the casual effect of using the Internet to gather politically relevant
news on attitudes towards the EU’s role in the economic crisis. Our findings show that
individuals who use the Internet to gather political news attribute greater blame to the
EU and are more likely to vote against European-level policies aimed at ameliorating the
crisis.
As Internet penetration grows and online newsgathering is embedded in the informa-
tion consumption routine of a large number of citizens, the implications of our findings are
particularly relevant to the literature on ‘media effects’. We also contribute to the debate
on reinforcement effects by providing evidence that they are not necessarily symmetric.
This lack of symmetry may be dependent on the particular context of this study, but
could also feasibly be motivated by the differential strength of pre-existing opinions, as
suggested by Bartels (1993). Studies from a range of disciplines within the social sciences
have showed that negative information is more memorable than positive information. Our
study contributes to this tradition by showing that this trend also applies to online-based
information.
The analysis of the Fiscal Compact Referendum survey provides evidence on the spe-
cific effects different online loci may have: spaces where factual information prevails (the
Referendum Commission website) foster a higher likelihood of voting in favour of the
Fiscal Treaty, whereas spaces that contain a high potential to amplify opinionated in-
formation do not. However, this finding is suggestive in nature, and we would submit
that tracing causal mechanisms that underlie the influence that online news exerts on
public opinion requires further investigation, with triangulation of observational data and
14
alternative sources. Without such triangulation, it is difficult to disentangle channel from
content effects. This has been done in laboratory experiments, where the content can be
held constant while varying the medium of transmission.21 What we have demonstrated in
this paper is that there is strong evidence that online newsgathering exerts a substantively
important and statistically significant anti-EU influence in terms of blame attribution for
the economic crisis.
Finally, our study engages with the recent literature that explores public attitudes
towards political actors and institutions in the context of the ongoing economic crisis
(Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit 2012; Marsh and Mikhaylov 2012; Magalhaes 2014).
By bringing the Internet into the picture, we have unveiled how online newsgathering can
provide an echo-chamber for anti-EU opinions. This has potentially strong implications
for an institution that remains obscure to many and is often secondary in the agenda of
traditional media.
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Figure 1: Geographical distribution of the instrument.
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Figure 2: Browsing online news in locations with and without broadband.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
EU Resp. 2.33 1.13 0 4
Online 0.18 0.38 0 1
Broadband Coverage 0.73 0.44 0 1
Rural 1.40 0.49 0 1
Income 6.18 3.92 1 11
Age 45.14 16.26 18 90
Education 3.32 1.26 1 6
Class 3.06 1.48 1 7
TV 0.97 0.18 0 1
Newspaper 0.86 0.34 0 1
Newspaper Fragmentation 0.04 0.20 0 1
Radio 0.87 0.33 0 1
Interest in Politics 2.64 0.86 1 4
Left 0.15 0.36 0 1
EU Confidence 2.47 0.86 1 4
Attitudes towards Immigration 5.26 1.77 1 8
Economy 0.27 0.45 0 1
Distance City 29.55 31.17 0 141.26
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Table 2: Entropy balancing.
Before Balancing After Balancing
Broadband = 0 Broadband = 1 t-test Broadband = 0 Broadband = 1 Balance
Rural 1.65 1.32 0.00 1.32 1.32 X
Income 6.35 6.12 0.27 X
Age 46.18 44.77 0.11 X
Education 3.14 3.39 0.00 3.39 3.39 X
Class 3.25 2.99 0.00 2.99 2.99 X
TV 0.97 0.96 0.73 X
Newspaper 0.83 0.88 0.02 0.87 0.87 X
Newspaper Fragmentation 0.04 0.04 0.97 X
Radio 0.87 0.88 0.74 X
Interest in Politics 2.54 2.68 0.00 2.68 2.68 X
Left 0.13 0.16 0.11 X
Distance City 34.63 27.82 0.00 27.84 27.82 X
EU Confidence 2.45 2.48 0.63 X
Attitudes towards Immigration 5.61 5.13 0.00 5.13 5.13 X
Economy 0.28 0.27 0.63 X
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Table 5: EU Fiscal Compact: 2SLS-IV (Model 15) and probit model (Model 16).
(15) (16)
Whole Whole
Probability of Voting "No" Probability of Voting "No"
Variables 2SLS-IV Probit
Online 0.386*
(0.020 - 0.753)
EU Commission Website -0.915***
(-1.480 - -0.349)
Forums & Blogs 0.274
(-0.373 - 0.922)
Age 0.056** -0.105**
(0.018 - 0.093) (-0.178 - -0.032)
Social Class 0.028* 0.045
(0.004 - 0.051) (-0.017 - 0.107)
Working Class 0.007 -0.017
(-0.006 - 0.020) (-0.074 - 0.039)
Rural 0.038*** 0.151**
(0.014 - 0.061) (0.050 - 0.252)
EU Confidence -0.178*** -1.020***
(-0.251 - -0.105) (-1.247 - -0.792)
Knowledge of Politics 0.002 -0.003
(-0.019 - 0.023) (-0.081 - 0.074)
Effect of the Treaty 0.157*** 0.804***
(0.118 - 0.196) (0.683 - 0.924)
Government Trust 0.136*** 0.457***
(0.076 - 0.196) (0.246 - 0.669)
Satisfaction with the Government 0.105** 0.499***
(0.035 - 0.174) (0.328 - 0.670)
Knowledge of Treaty -0.021 -0.038
(-0.073 - 0.030) (-0.211 - 0.135)
Constant -1.089*** -4.724***
(-1.486 - -0.691) (-5.711 - -3.738)
Broadband Coverage 0.816***
(0.418 - 1.214)
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 25.337***
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic 13.428***
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 2.77*
Constituency fixed-effects yes yes
Balancing yes no
Observations 948 948
RMSE 0.310 .
Robust ci in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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